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U.S. AGRICULTURAL EXPORTS 
AND THE FOOD SECURITY ACT OF 1985 
The importance of exports to the prosperity of U.S. agriculture 
is well known, as is the recent decline in farm exports. In Fiscal 
Year (FY) 1986, agricultural exports are projected at $28 billion, 35 
percent below the peak reached in FY 1981. Equally sobering, the net 
agricultural trade surplus has declined from $26.6 billion in FY 1981 
to an estimated $7 billion 1n FY 1986, a 74 percent decline; and the 
value of exports as a share of farm cash receipts has declined from 
30 percent in FY 1981 to 20 percent this year. 
Concern over the decline in farm exports figured prominently in 
shaping The Food Security Act of 1985. Several export enhancement 
programs were authorized and price support levels were set on a 
downward path. These provisions have renewed optimism by many 
observers that U.S. agricultural exports will increase although the 
decline in price support is shrouded in debate over the short, 
medium, and long term responsiveness of U.S. export demand to lower 
U.S. prices. The optimism of these observers has bePn further 
nurtured by the depreciation of the U.S. dollar. 
However, we believe that careful examination of these argu-
ments tempers this optimism, whatever the price responsiveness of 
U.S. export demand. 
VALUE OF U.S. DOLLAR 
The decline in value of the U.S. dollar, which began in March 
1985, is often cited as portending future increases in agricultural 
exports. However, this argument is based upon only a partial analysis 
of changes in dollar values. The dollar has declined in value 
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against most Western European currencies and the Japanese yen. For 
example, between April I, 1985 and January 1, 1986, the real value of 
the U.S. dollar, when adjusted for differences in consumer prices 
and measured against the French franc, German mark, and Japanese yen, 
declined by 28, 25, and 23 percent respectively. (Data available on 
consumer prices prevent analysis later than January 1986.) 
But, in terms of increasing the competitiveness of U.S. agricul-
tural exports, what is important is the change in the value of the 
U.S. dollar relative to the currencies of our export competitors. 
Over the April 1, 1985 to January 1, 1986 period, the real value of 
the dollar increased by 2 percent against the Argentinian austral and 
the Canadian dollar, did not change relative to the Brazilian 
cruzeiro (cruzado now), and declined by only 3 percent against the 
Thai baht. Based upon available evidence, there has also been 
little change against the Australian dollar, Chinese yuan, and 
South African Rand, but exact calculations are precluded by the lack 
of adequate consumer price data for these countries. Thus, except for 
our European competitors, the real exchange value of the dollar has 
actually changed very little relative to the currencies of our 
agricultural competitors. This lack of change against the currencies 
of major export competitors tempers the increase in U.S. agricultural 
exports which can be expected from the commonly discussed 
depreciation of the U.S. dollar, thus shifting more of the burden for 
increasing U.S. export competitiveness to the provisions of the new 
farm bill and other factors. 
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EXPORT ENHANCEMENT PROGRAMS 
The Food Security Act of 1985 contains an array of export 
enhancement programs: reauthorization of PL 480, an expanded 
Section 416 program, a new pilot barter program, reauthorization of 
short (less than three year) and intermediate (3-10 year) export 
credit programs, a new export payment-in-kind subsidy program, a 
targeted subsidy program to offset unfair trade practices of 
specific competitors, and a new "Food for Progress" program. These 
programs are certain to increase the proportion of exports sold under 
some form of government assistance. This proportion has already 
nearly tripled 1n the 1980s -- from 7 percent in 1980 to 19 percent 
in 1985 -- with the advent of expanded export credit programs. Given 
the new initiatives included 1n the 1985 Farm Bill, it would not be 
surprising if this proportion reached 25 percent in FY 1986, a level 
last attained 1n FY 1973. 
Under the assumption that nothing else changes, these programs 
would enhance U.S. agricultural exports. However, they appear to be 
stimulating new or increased export assistance programs by our compe-
titors, such as increased export subsidies from the European Common 
Market (EC). Given these types of competitive reactions, export 
assistance programs become factors in maintaining current export 
sales, but are unlikely to enhance U.S. market shares. Ex:ports 
shipped with assistance may also replace commercial exports which 
would have occurred in the absence of the assistance programs. These 
possibilities are made even more likely by the fact that world 
agricultural trade, after growing rapidly in the 1970's, has leveled 
out in the 200-220 million metric ton range so far in the 1980's. 
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The targeted export subsidy programs are aimed at reclaiming 
markets lost to what, in the U.S. view, was unfair competition, 
especially by the EC. This has the effect of discriminating against 
some of our customers, such as Japan and other Southeast Asian 
countries, because they buy a relatively small amount of European 
farm products. These countries end up paying a higher price for the 
same U.S. exports that are being subsidized to other countries. 
While it is too early to forecast the response to this discrimina-
tion, the slighted countries may decide to increase their purchases 
from U.S. agricultural export competitors. 
Thus, everything else is rarely constant 1n the world of inter-
national trade, especially when the countervailing forces set in 
motion by export enhancement programs are considered. This calls 
into question the size of any increase in exports that will result 
from export enhancement programs. Certainly the experience in the 
early 1980s is not encouraging. 
U.S. LOAN LEVELS 
Using authority contained in The Food Security Act of 1985, the 
Secretary of Agriculture lowered 1986 price support levels for most 
program commodities by at least 25 percent. The decision was 
explained on the basis that lower prices will help the U.S. regain 
lost export markets. It has also brought forth heated debate over 
the short, medium, and long term responsiveness of export sales to 
changes in U.S. prices. However, the debate has tended to ignore the 
international political dimensions of U.S. loan rates. While the 
U.S. views the sharp decline in price supports as a competitive move 
to regain lost markets, our export competitors view it as predatory 
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pricing. While the U.S. vi~ws deficiency payments as a means for 
maintaining the income of family farmers in light of cuts 1n price 
supports, our export competitors view them as subsidies that encour-
age American farmers to produce more even though the loan rate, let 
alone the market equilibrium price, provides incentives to produce 
less. Therefore, it should come as little surprise that (1) Argen-
tinian farmers are protesting and calling for, among other policy 
changes, a reduction in taxes on farm exports; (2) Thai farmers and 
students are protesting the marketing loan initiated for U.S. rice 
and calling for assistance; (3) Australian wheat farmers are calling 
for increased government involvement; and (4) Canadian corn farmers 
are seeking a countervailing duty on U.S. corn imports. In the eyes 
of our competitors, the sharp decline 1n price supports has become an 
attempt to export our farm cr1s1s. 
This view is fanning the winds of trade protectionism. Already, 
potential trade wars over limitations on U.S. textile imports and the 
ascension of Spain and Portugal to the EC have significant implica-
tions for the U.S. farm economy. In 1985, Congress passed, but 
President Reagan vetoed, a bill which would limit clothing and 
textiles imports from Taiwan, South Korea, Hong Kong, and other Third 
World countries. An override vote is scheduled for August 1986. In 
1984, Taiwan, South Korea, and Hong Kong accounted for 44 percent of 
the U.S. imports of cotton, wool and man-made fibers. 
The EC dispute involves a series of tariffs and quotas that 
begin with the merging of Spanish and Portuguese agricultural 
policies into the EC's Common Agricultural Policy. This includes 
restrictions on soybean and feed grain imports by Spain and Portugal. 
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In rPsponse, the U.S. announced various trade restrictions if lhe EC 
re~trictions are imposed. The EC then announc~d that they would 
retaliate against the U.S.'s threatened restrictions. Currently, 
discusqions are going on to circumvent the ret~liation cycle. 
The U.S. has a substantial share of its agricultural trade and 
trade surplus at risk in the textile and EC trade wars. In 1984, the 
latest year for which information is available, agricultural exports 
to South Korea, Taiwan, and Hong Kong totaled $3.5 billion; to Spain 
and Portugal, $1.7 billion; and $6.5 billion to other EC countries 
(Belgium, Denmark, France, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Luxemburg, 
Netherlands, United Kingdom, and West Germany). In sum, these 
exports totaled to 31 percent of all U.S. agricultural export9. The 
net agricultural trade surplus with these countries was $3.2, $1.4 
and $3.3 billion respectively, accounting for 42 percent of the 
total U.S. agricultural trade surplus. 
In the short run, the sharp reduction 1n U.S. price support 
levels may do little more than encourage increased protectionism and 
export assistance by our competitors. In the long run, it may 
encourage self-sufficiency among our competitors as they channel 
production resources from current export commodities, which in their 
view are being attacked by the U.S., to agricultural products 
currently imported. In recent years, Brazil ha~ rearranged its price 
support system to encourage corn and wheat production while the EC 
has done the same for oilseed production. Currently, both import 
these commodities from the United States. 
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This internal ional political v1ew of changes in U.S. loan rates 
argues that sharp reductions in price supports set 1n motion institu-
tional constraints which limit the quantity response to price 
declines, whatever the underlying price responsiveness of export 
demand. At the very least, this view argues for moderation in 
reducing U.S. price support levels for export commodities. 
SUMMARY 
The Food Security Act of 1985 had as one of its objectives 
increased u.s. agricultural exports. To accomplish this goal, price 
support loan rates were lowered and a variety of export enhancement 
programs were authorized. However, the current world agricultural 
trade environment and the experiences of the early 1980s suggest that 
export enhancement programs will more likely maintain rather than 
enhance U.S. agricultural exports. The decline in price support 
levels, especially the sharp declines initiated for 1986, has spurred 
international resentment against what is perceived as predilory 
pricing by the U.S. This resentment comes against a background of 
growing worldwide protectionism. These considerations, along with 
the size of U.S. agricultural exports currently at risk in potential 
trade wars over U.S. text i 1 e imports and Spain and Portugal's 
admission to the EC, as well as the lack of appreciable declines in 
the value of the U.S. dollar against the currencies of our non-Euro-
pean agricultural competitors, suggest that the value of U.S. 
exports, if not quantity, is unlikely to increase and may actually 
decline over the next few years. In short, despite the intentions 
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and objectives of The Food SPcurity Act of 1985, exports have 
probably shifted from being an engine of growth to being a catalyst 
for downsizing U.S. agriculture. 
